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The interplay between employee and firm customer orientation:  
Substitution effect and the contingency role of performance-related rewards 
 
Abstract 
This paper identifies and explains a potential tension between a firm’s emphasis on customer 
orientation (CO) and the extent to which employees value CO as a success factor for 
individual performance. Based on self-determination theory and CO implementation research, 
we propose that firm CO may represent both autonomous and controlled motivations for CO, 
but that employees’ CO is more strongly linked to individual performance when employees 
experience solely autonomous motivation. Hence, we expect a substitution effect whereby the 
link between employees’ CO and their performance is weaker when firm CO is high. 
Furthermore, we examine a boundary condition for the previous hypothesis and propose that 
performance-contingent rewards have a positive effect on the internalization of the extrinsic 
motivation stemming from firm CO. Two multilevel studies with 979 employees and 201 top 
management team members from 132 firms support our hypotheses. Against previous 
research, our findings offer a new perspective on the effectiveness of CO initiatives, propose 
employees’ motivational states as the theoretical explanation for the heterogeneity in the link 
between employee CO and performance, and reappraise the role of performance-contingent 
rewards in CO research. We provide managerial implications for the effective implementation 
of customer-oriented initiatives within firms. 
  
Introduction 
It is widely accepted that a firm’s ability to benefit from a customer orientation (CO) is 
contingent on the employees who implement it (e.g. Brach et al., 2015; Kennedy, Lassk and 
Goolsby, 2002; Lin et al., 2016). Many companies are acting on this belief, as witnessed by 
organization-wide CO initiatives such as GE’s Gold Standard in Marketing Program and 
Macy’s Customer Centric Initiative. However, many of these efforts are ineffective. For 
example, evidence indicates that while 56% of firms perceive themselves as being very 
customer oriented, only 12% of their customers agree (CMO Council, 2008). Critical to the 
success of CO initiatives is the understanding of what motivates employees to adopt a CO.  
The CO implementation literature suggests two such motivations: the need to comply 
with the normative mandate of the firm (Gebhardt, Carpenter and Sherry, 2006) and the self-
driven recognition of CO as an important job value (Zablah et al., 2012). These two 
motivations can be differentiated in line with self-determination theory (SDT), a macro theory 
of motivation that explains how employees identify with values and behaviours that are 
endorsed by their firm (Gagné and Deci, 2005; Ryan and Deci, 2000). First, organizational 
leaders establish, diffuse and institutionalize customer-oriented values and norms in top-down 
CO initiatives (e.g. Stock and Hoyer, 2002). In line with the normative perspective of the CO 
literature, SDT suggests that as a result of organizational CO initiatives, employees will 
become more customer oriented in response to an inducement by an external agent. This 
external source of CO may lead employees to internalize the importance of CO in their work 
value set (i.e. autonomous motivation), and/or to act based on a certain sense of pressure and 
obligation (i.e. controlled motivation). Second, employees’ identification with CO as a work-
related value may also be a self-induced choice, driven by inherent personal interest (i.e. 
autonomous motivation). Thus, employee CO can result from a purely autonomous 
motivation (low external stimulus for CO, high personal interest in CO), from a rather 
controlled motivation (high external stimulus for CO, low personal interest in CO), or from a 
combination of both (high external stimulus for CO, high personal interest in CO). 
Importantly, there is growing consensus in recent SDT research that autonomous and 
controlled motivations coexist independently of each other in the work context (e.g. Cerasoli, 
Nicklin and Ford, 2014; Gerhart and Fang, 2015; Grant et al., 2011). Moreover, SDT research 
indicates that the combination of controlled and autonomous motivations towards the same 
behaviour may lead to different performance outcomes for employees (Gagné and Deci, 
2005). For example, Grant et al. (2011) found across two studies that the same level of 
initiative among highly autonomously motivated employees was more positively related to 
performance when they reported low levels of controlled motivation. This may pinpoint a 
potential tension between firm CO and individual CO. If employees perceive firm CO as 
controlled motivation, CO will not be fully internalized and therefore the relationship between 
employee CO and performance will be weaker. In contrast, if firm CO is perceived as a driver 
of autonomous motivation, the employee CO–performance link will be stronger due to a 
higher degree of CO internalization. Despite the relevance of this issue for understanding 
employees’ motivation for CO, no previous study has investigated the cross-level interaction 
between organizational CO and employee CO in relation to employee performance. Thus, the 
overarching research question of this study is: Under what circumstances will firm CO induce 
autonomous (versus controlled) motivation?  
While taking into account a wide range of individual and organizational factors, we 
identify performance-related rewards as the key contingency variable to address our research 
question (Gerhart and Fang, 2015). We advance that performance-contingent rewards may 
help direct firm CO towards increasing employees’ autonomous motivation for CO, and have 
a positive effect on the internalization of firm CO (Gagné and Deci, 2005; Ryan, Mims and 
Koestner, 1983). To date, there is limited knowledge of the role of performance-related 
rewards in CO research; existing studies advancing a direct link between performance-related 
rewards, employee CO and employee performance often report non-significant results (e.g. 
Liao and Chuang 2004; MacKenzie, Podsakoff and Rich, 2001; Schmitz and Ganesan 2014). 
Recent contributions have suggested adopting a contingency approach when studying the 
effectiveness of performance incentives (Gagné and Deci 2005; Gerhart and Fang, 2015). 
Following this line of research, in this study we examine how the interplay between 
performance-contingent rewards, firm CO and employee CO affects employee performance.  
We test our conceptual framework through two multilevel studies comprising three 
independent samples composed of 979 employees and 201 top management team members 
from 132 firms. We use two different contexts, back office employees in Study 1 and 
customer-contact employees from various business-to-business (B2B) companies in Study 2, 
to strengthen the external validity of our findings. In Study 1 we find that employee CO is 
positively related to employee performance when firm CO is low, but not when firm CO is 
high. In Study 2 we replicate this result and additionally find that performance-contingent 
rewards counteract the buffering effect of firm CO, such that when these rewards are present, 
the positive relationship between employee CO and performance holds under both high and 
low levels of firm CO.  
Our work provides three major contributions to the management literature (see Table 1). 
First, we identify an interesting substitution effect between the emphasis a firm places on CO 
and the extent to which employees perceive it as an individual success factor. Our model 
suggests that the failure to consider these two factors simultaneously may jeopardize the 
implementation of customer-oriented initiatives. Second, we empirically support the 
moderating role of firm CO as a new source of heterogeneity in the relationship between 
employees’ CO and their performance, and theoretically explain this effect by considering the 
different motivational states of employees.  
Table 1. Overview of existing literature and contributions of this study 
 Key Studies Key Findings Research Gap Contributions of this Study 
Influence of firm’s CO on 
employees’ CO 
 
Boles et al., 2001 
Cross et al., 2007 
Guenzi et al., 2011 
Liao and Subramony, 2008 
Williams and Attaway, 1996 
 
Firm CO, both in terms of top 
management teams’ CO and 
organizational CO, increases 
employees’ CO. 
Previous research did not 
differentiate between 
controlled and autonomous 
motivation of employees for 
CO, nor did it consider the 
implications of these different 
kinds of motivation. 
Contribution 1: 
Identifying and explaining a 
tension between the firm’s 
emphasis on CO and 
employees’ internalization of 
CO and investigating its 
implications. 
Influence of employees’ CO 
on employees’ performance 
 
Boles et al., 2001 
Cross et al., 2007 
Donavan et al., 2004 
Franke and Park, 2006 
Kennedy et al., 2002 
Zablah et al., 2012 
 
Employees’ CO increases 
several desirable job 
outcomes, including 
employees’ performance, 
both for back office and 
customer-contact employees 
in service and sales contexts. 
Meta-analytic investigations 
found unexplained 
heterogeneity in the 
relationship between 
employees’ CO and their 
performance. 
Contribution 2: 
Investigating the moderating 
role of the firm’s CO in the 
relationship between 
employees’ CO and their 
performance. 
Influence of performance-
contingent rewards on 
employees’ CO and 
employees’ performance 
Liao and Chuang, 2004 
MacKenzie et al., 2001 
Schmitz and Ganesan, 2014 
Previous research found no 
significant associations 
between performance-
contingent rewards and (a) 
store-level CO, (b) 
employees’ customer-directed 
efforts and (c) employee 
performance. 
Previous research did not 
consider the interplay 
between performance-
contingent rewards and the 
controlled motivation of firm 
CO. 
Contribution 3: 
Resolving the tension 
between the firm’s emphasis 
on CO and employees’ 
internalization of CO by 
investigating the moderating 
role of performance-
contingent rewards in the 
relationship between the 
firm’s CO, employees’ CO 
and employees’ performance. 
 
Third, our study brings new knowledge concerning the role of performance-contingent 
rewards in customer-oriented firms; our contingency approach complements and extends 
previous studies focusing on the direct effect of rewards. Our study further informs the design 
of performance-contingent rewards by reporting the effectiveness of a specific type of 
incentive (i.e. directly performance-salient incentives). Also, our results offer managers a 
unified framework to understand and manage the complexity of autonomous and controlled 
motivations within CO initiatives.  
 
Conceptual background and hypotheses 
Baseline relationships from prior research 
Employee CO, defined as an attitude and a set of behaviours to meet customer needs on the 
job (e.g. Brach et al., 2015; Zablah et al., 2012), is an important antecedent of individual 
performance. For example, customer-contact employees with a high CO are more likely to 
identify a customer’s needs and the services or products that will best solve customer 
problems, thus enhancing their performance (Boles et al., 2001; Cross et al., 2007). However, 
even those who have no direct customer contact should focus their efforts on external 
customers in order to fulfil their job expectations (Kennedy, Lassk and Goolsby, 2002; Lin et 
al., 2016). CO affects the performance of back office employees by motivating collaborative 
exchanges with customer-contact employees (Liao and Subramony, 2008), and enhances job 
satisfaction, commitment and organizational citizenship behaviours (Donavan, Brown and 
Mowen, 2004), which will further improve employee performance.  
Scholars further suggest that firm CO, defined as organization-wide culture, practices and 
processes that help to put the customer’s interests first (Deshpandé, Farley and Webster, 
1993), is transferred to employees through the dissemination of shared values and behavioural 
norms (Stock and Hoyer, 2002). In line with these suggestions, previous research indicates 
that firm CO is positively related to the CO of both customer-contact and back office 
employees. Liao and Subramony (2008) used the CO of the top management team as a proxy 
for firm CO and found that individual employees in both customer-contact and back office 
roles are motivated to be more customer oriented by the top management team. Other studies 
have revealed that a customer-oriented organizational culture and processes positively affect 
employee CO (e.g. Guenzi, De Luca and Troilo, 2011; Williams and Attaway, 1996).  
The studies of Boles et al. (2001) and Cross et al. (2007) combined the two effects, 
indicating that firm CO influences employee performance via employee CO, while not 
formally testing for an indirect effect. In sum, a review of key studies provides ample support 
for the notion that employee CO is positively related to employee performance, firm CO is 
positively related to employee CO and firm CO may have a positive indirect effect on 
employee performance via employee CO. We position our study in this literature by using 
these relationships as baseline effects in our analyses (see Figure 1). 
 
The substitution between firm and employee customer orientation 
In the preceding subsection, we reviewed the CO implementation research, which indicates 
that firm CO is an important antecedent of employee CO. While generally supporting the 
effectiveness of external motivation on individual behaviour, SDT makes a key distinction 
between autonomous and controlled motivation, both stemming from external sources (Gagné 
and Deci, 2005). Autonomous motivation means acting on one’s own volition and 
experiencing a sense of choice in adopting a certain behaviour (Ryan and Deci, 2000). We 
consider firm CO as a possible driver of autonomous motivation for CO because previous 
research found that at least some employees unreservedly adopted a CO advocated by the firm 
(Harris and Ogbonna, 2000). Controlled motivation means acting under external pressure and 
experiencing no choice in adopting a certain behaviour (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Given that CO 
initiatives often instil a sense of pressure, which urges employees to adopt CO, we consider 
firm CO to be also a possible driver of controlled motivation for CO. 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework: The interplay between firm and employee customer orientation 
 
 
 
For instance, the terminology used to describe customer-oriented initiatives often reflects the 
controlled motivation concept: customer-oriented values and norms are ‘inculcated’ 
(Lichtenthal and Wilson 1992, p. 194), and employees are ‘indoctrinated’ (Gebhardt, 
Carpenter and Sherry, 2006, p. 48). Indeed, the need for employees to keep their jobs, meet 
managers’ expectations and embrace the organizational culture may push them to comply 
with CO, irrespective of their autonomous motivation towards the behaviour. Thus, the 
extrinsic motivation of firm CO varies in its degree of self-determination and may be both a 
driver of autonomous and controlled motivation for CO (Gagné and Deci, 2005). In contrast, 
the intrinsic motivation of employees’ personal interest in CO is invariantly self-determined 
and thus solely a driver of autonomous motivation for CO (Gagné and Deci, 2005). 
Following Amabile (1993), Cerasoli, Nicklin and Ford (2014), Gerhart and Fang (2015) 
and Grant et al. (2011), amongst others, we conceptualize autonomous and controlled 
motivations as orthogonal in the work context (see Figure 2). In support for this 
conceptualization, empirical studies have found – based on non-significant correlations – that 
autonomous and controlled motivations are independent of each other, and concluded that 
these two motivations ‘are essentially orthogonal’ (Amabile et al., 1994, p. 958). In line with 
recent meta-analytic investigations (Cerasoli, Nicklin and Ford, 2014), we propose that both 
autonomous and controlled motivations may lead to a desired behaviour (e.g. employee CO). 
The effectiveness of such behaviour, when it occurs, is another matter as the different kinds of 
motivation that lead to the desired behaviour may also determine its ability to produce desired 
outcomes (Grant et al., 2011). Thus, it is important to understand how employees’ motivation 
for CO influences the effectiveness of their CO. We expect employee CO to be more strongly 
related to performance under purely autonomous motivation. In this situation, we expect the 
benefits of CO for individual performance to exceed those generated when employees 
experience rather controlled motivation or high levels of both autonomous and controlled 
motivation. 
Figure 2. Autonomous and controlled motivations for employee CO 
 
 
 
Notes: Based on Grant et al. (2011). Although earlier work in SDT treats autonomous and controlled motivations as opposite poles of a single continuum, there is growing consensus with regard 
to conceptualizing these motivations as orthogonal in the work context (e.g. Amabile, 1993; Cerasoli et al., 2014; Gerhart and Fang, 2015). Empirically, Amabile et al. (1994, p. 958) and Grant 
et al. (2011, p. 245) found in several samples that autonomous and controlled motivations are independent. We expect the effectiveness of employee CO (i.e. its performance effect) to be highest 
under conditions of purely autonomous motivation (grey area). 
The strongest link between employee CO and employee performance should occur when 
motivation is purely autonomous as employees have an inherent personal interest in CO in 
spite of the low level of firm CO. Under these circumstances, employees are more likely to 
engage in the most effective forms of CO as their autonomous motivation helps them 
maintain attention, interest, energy and enthusiasm, thus facilitating effective effort (Gagné 
and Deci, 2005). Indeed, Ryan and Deci (2000, p. 69) argue that the more autonomous the 
motivation, the higher its quality and the more authentic it is, which means that employees 
‘have more interest, excitement, and confidence, which in turn is manifest … as enhanced 
performance’. In addition, low levels of firm CO should make individual CO behaviours 
stand out more, granting additional performance advantages to the employees promoting and 
adopting such behaviours, relative to others. 
At the opposite extreme, when employee’s inherent personal interest in CO is low despite 
the high firm CO, we expect a weaker link between employee CO and employee performance. 
This is because low levels of personal interest in CO, despite the high emphasis on CO by the 
firm, is likely to lead employees towards mere compliance, which may often result in an 
uninspired approach to addressing customer needs, and low levels of effort towards customer-
related obligations (Gagné and Deci, 2005). Therefore, the combination of low personal 
interest in CO and high firm CO is likely to result in firm CO be perceived as controlled 
motivation, which is met by a certain degree of resistance by the employee (Harris and 
Ogbonna 2000). 
Even when both firm CO and employees’ personal interest in CO are high, we expect that 
CO may still be less strongly related to performance than under pure inherently autonomous 
motivation. We propose that when both individual and firm CO motivations are high, 
employees may experience motivational ambivalence and conflicting goals (Fong and 
Tiedens, 2002; Grant et al., 2011). Autonomous motivation will pull employees in the 
direction of CO as they view it as bringing inherent enjoyment and fulfilment in their work 
(Grant, 2008). On the other hand, controlled motivation provides employees with a perception 
of being externally directed (Gagné and Deci, 2005), which may reduce the willingness to 
allocate resources and efforts to engaging in effective forms of CO. In addition, higher levels 
of controlled motivation will create an internal environment whereby CO is socially expected; 
in this context, customer-oriented individuals are less likely to emerge or to attribute unique 
performance advantages to their CO. Thus, the presence of both autonomous and controlled 
motivations is likely to create a motivational ambivalence that can at least partially reduce the 
benefits of high autonomous motivation alone (Grant et al., 2011).  
Complementary explanations for why the effectiveness of CO may be highest under pure 
autonomous motivation are offered by emotional labour theory and the CO literature. 
Emotional labour theory differentiates between surface acting and deep acting as two 
outcomes of employees’ CO (Yoo and Arnold 2016) and suggests that the link between 
employee CO and performance is stronger when the emotion regulation of employees is more 
authentic (i.e. deep acting: Allen et al., 2010; Brach et al., 2015). As autonomous motivation 
is associated with higher internalization of behaviours and thus with authenticity, we expect 
employees’ CO to be more strongly associated with their performance if they are fully 
autonomously motivated for CO. The CO literature echoes this idea by highlighting the 
positive performance effects of customer-oriented authenticity (Hennig-Thurau et al., 2006).  
In summary, based on SDT we expect employee CO to be linked to autonomous 
motivation, and firm CO to be linked to both autonomous and controlled motivation. Building 
on this, we predict that employee CO will be most strongly associated with performance when 
employees experience high autonomous and low controlled motivation due to the experience 
of choice, energy and enthusiasm. This condition is more likely characterized by high 
personal interest for CO and low firm CO. On the other hand, the performance payoff of 
employee CO will diminish when motivation is both autonomous and controlled (i.e. high 
personal interest for CO, high firm CO) due to ambivalence and associated self-regulatory 
efforts and stress. The payoff from employee CO is also likely to suffer when motivation is 
rather controlled (i.e. low personal interest for CO, high firm CO) due to the predominant 
effect of perceived external pressure. Thus: 
H1: Other things being equal, the firm’s customer orientation negatively moderates the 
positive relationship between employees’ customer orientation and their performance, 
such that the higher the firm’s customer orientation, the weaker the relationship. 
 
Performance-contingent rewards as a boundary condition 
Performance-contingent rewards are defined as the performance-related compensation 
received by employees (e.g. Procter et al., 1993). Previous research has found no significant 
associations between performance-contingent rewards and store-level CO (Liao and Chuang, 
2004), employees’ customer-directed efforts (Schmitz and Ganesan, 2014) and employee 
performance (MacKenzie, Podsakoff and Rich, 2001). Thus, we treat these rewards as 
exogenous to a firm’s CO as they can be adopted by firms with either high or low CO.1 
An important aspect of SDT is that ‘extrinsic motivation can vary in the degree to which 
it is autonomous versus controlled’ (Gagné and Deci 2005, p. 334), and that performance-
contingent rewards ‘may actually have a net positive effect on autonomous motivation’ 
(Gerhardt and Fang, 2015, p. 505). This corresponds to the central proposition of SDT that 
‘when a socially-valued activity is prompted by extrinsic motivation in an autonomy-
supportive social context, people will tend to internalize and integrate the regulation of that 
behaviour’ (Gagné and Deci, 2005, p. 349). This view challenges the strong assumption in 
previous theories on work motivation, such as cognitive evaluation theory, according to which 
extrinsic rewards are always detrimental for the individual internalization of focal behaviours 
(Deci, Koestner and Ryan, 1999; Gerhardt and Fang, 2015). Thus, in line with SDT, we 
                                                          
1
  This point is reinforced by the non-significant correlation between organizational CO and performance-
contingent rewards we found in our data. 
expect performance-contingent rewards to mitigate the substitution effect between employee 
CO and firm CO. We advance three related theoretical explanations to articulate our 
hypothesis.  
First, performance-contingent rewards foster the perception of competence among 
employees and provide them with more satisfaction of their need for individual autonomy 
(Hoheneberg and Homburg, 2016; Ryan, Mims and Koestner, 1983). This has a positive 
effect on the internalization of extrinsic motivation, which therefore decreases the chances 
that firm CO is perceived as a form of controlled motivation. Second, the marketing literature 
typically suggests that the superior value generated by a CO is shared between the firm and its 
customers (Narver and Slater, 1990). While customers benefit from better and more 
customized services, firms benefit from superior customer, market and financial performance. 
In this context, the introduction of performance-contingent rewards represents a mechanism 
employees can leverage to appropriate a share of the value that they generate through their 
customer-oriented behaviour, which otherwise would only benefit the firm and the customer. 
This again should help in the internalization of the otherwise rather controlled motivation of 
firm CO. Third, a recent meta-analysis found that directly performance-salient incentives, 
such as performance-contingent rewards, ‘impart a competence-boosting message, thus also 
boosting intrinsic motivation’ (Cerasoli, Nicklin and Ford, 2014, p. 983). In line with this 
finding, Gerhardt and Fang (2015, p. 498) posit that: ‘employees generally feel inequitably 
treated if extrinsic rewards do not correspond to their performance, and inequity will 
negatively influence motivation and creativity’. This can reinforce the mixed messages 
associated with ambivalent motivation (Grant et al., 2011) because employees will be more 
likely to interpret an ambivalent motivation as externally controlled, and will be less creative 
in addressing and satisfying customer needs, both factors leading to a weaker link between 
their individual CO and performance. Following this reasoning, the substitution effect of 
between firm CO and employee CO in the link with employee performance should be 
observed in conditions of low performance-contingent rewards, but not in conditions of high-
performance rewards: 
H2: Other things being equal, the substitution effect of the firm’s customer orientation on 
the relationship between employees’ customer orientation and their performance is 
weaker when employees receive higher levels of performance-contingent rewards. 
 
Study 1 
Data collection and measures 
For Study 1, we gathered data from a convenience sample of the top management teams, back 
office employees, and managerial key informants in 77 German manufacturing firms from 
various industries taking part in executive education at the first author’s university. All firms 
received a benchmark report as an incentive. We pre-tested the measurement scales with 
seven top management team members and 15 employees during a company workshop. None 
of the pre-test participants took part in the main study. The exclusion of seven firms due to 
missing data led to a final sample of matched data from 201 top management team members 
and 813 back office employees from 70 firms. We used multiple data sources to avoid same-
source bias. Specifically, we used online surveys to collect data on firm CO from top 
management team members and data on employee CO, gender, age, education, tenure and 
performance from employees. We collected data on numbers of employee and turnover from 
company records. We found no systematic differences in the means for demographics or other 
study constructs between early and late respondents. 
Appendix 1 provides an overview of all measurement items and reliability measures; 
Table 2 displays means, standard deviations and average variance extracted. All scales had 
satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha values. We used the employee CO scale from Liao and 
Subramony (2008) because this measure is uniquely suitable for employees with no direct 
customer contact. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations in both studies 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Level 2: Firma                    
1. Firm Customer Orientation  – -0.03 0.15* -0.01 0.07* – 0.10* 0.04 0.03 0.08* – 0.20* – 0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.08* 0.00b 
2. Firm Selling Orientation -0.19*  – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 
3. Organizational Formalization 0.44* -0.25*  0.27* 0.15* -0.04 – -0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 – -0.16* – -0.24* -0.31* -0.24* -0.11* 0.00b 
4. Number of Employees -0.02 0.07 0.12  0.46* -0.03 – 0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.02 – -0.08* – 0.04 0.07* -0.15* 0.17* 0.00b 
5. Turnover in the Previous Year -0.21* -0.06 -0.01 0.29*  0.07* – 0.06 -0.08* 0.04 0.07* – 0.18* – -0.02 0.13* -0.19* 0.27* 0.00b 
Level 1: Employee                    
6. Employee Customer Orientation 0.24* 0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.23*  – 0.20* -0.26* -0.10* 0.25* – 0.08* – -0.07* 0.17* 0.06 0.12* 0.12* 
7. Employee Selling Orientation -0.13 0.36* -0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.34*  – – – – – – – – – – – – 
8. Employee Job Resources 0.41* -0.26* 0.25* 0.05 -0.13 0.27* -0.19*  -0.17* -0.15* 0.17* – -0.04 – 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.11* 
9. Employee Job Demands 0.29* 0.04 0.19* 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.15 0.20*  0.16* -0.18* – 0.09* – 0.06 0.02 -0.07* -0.08* -0.20* 
10. Employee Job Stress – – – – – – – – –  -0.12* – 0.00 – -0.10* -0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.20* 
11. Employee Job Engagement – – – – – – – – – –  – 0.08* – -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.11* 
12. Employee Emotional Labour 0.13 -0.18* 0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.12 0.05 0.18* 0.11 – –  – – – – – – – 
13. Co-Worker Customer Orientation 0.26* 0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.25* 0.40* -0.02 0.19* 0.09 – – 0.11  – -0.14* 0.03 0.10* 0.12* -0.04 
14. Performance-Contingent Rewards  -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 0.11 0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.19* – – -0.01 0.01  – – – – – 
15. Employee Gender 0.06 0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.07 -0.15 -0.05 -0.02 – – -0.10 0.06 0.03  -0.08* 0.16* -0.07* -0.03 
16. Employee Age 0.02 -0.01 0.12 -0.08 -0.02 0.08 -0.14 0.18* 0.14 – – 0.04 -0.11 0.01 0.06  0.01 0.55* -0.04 
17. Employee Education 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.11 0.10 -0.17* -0.06 -0.04 0.16* – – -0.06 -0.09 0.05 -0.10 0.01  -0.22* -0.08* 
18. Employee Tenure -0.01 -0.16* 0.10 0.05 0.08 -0.02 -0.15 0.15 -0.07 – – 0.04 -0.10 0.08 0.12 0.42* -0.03  -0.07* 
19. Employee Performance 0.22* -0.19* 0.07 -0.01 -0.07 0.41* -0.29* 0.15 -0.05 – – 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.06 -0.06 0.05  
Study 1: Mean 6.45 – 4.53 6.71 18.81 5.95 – 5.40 2.29 3.31 5.41 – 5.95 – 0.69 39.56 3.33 11.48 0.00 
Study 1: Standard Deviation 0.49 – 0.54 1.25 2.27 0.89 – 1.32 1.16 7.72 1.45 – 0.28 – 0.45 8.97 1.70 9.11 24.35 
Study 1: Average Variance Extracted 0.52 – 0.66 – – 0.57 – – – – – – – – – – – – – 
Study 2: Mean 5.25 2.72 4.78 4.15 4.47 6.38 2.06 3.75 0.79 – – 5.11 6.38 0.32 0.91 44.84 4.41 10.12 5.30 
Study 2: Standard Deviation 0.98 0.88 1.16 1.44 1.39 0.64 1.03 0.75 0.13 – – 1.19 0.58 0.26 0.28 9.38 1.11 8.18 1.02 
Study 2: Average Variance Extracted 0.53 0.52 – – – 0.59 0.69 0.61 – – – – – – – – – – 0.55 
 
Notes: a Correlations are based on scores disaggregated per employee. b Study 1 measures employees’ performance relative to others in the same firm. Study 1 (2) correlations are reported above 
(below) the diagonal. NStudy1 = 813 employees and 70 firms, NStudy2 = 166 employees and 62 firms. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Significance is based on two-tailed tests. The measurement is 
explained in the Appendix. 
 
In addition, we aggregated the CO scores of top management team members, measured 
using the same scale as in Liao and Subramony (2008), to capture the customer-related 
attitudes of senior managers as a proxy for the firm’s CO. In fact, employees without direct 
customer contact are likely to look to the top management team as a signifier of the firm’s CO 
(Liao and Subramony, 2008). We obtained statistical support for aggregating top management 
team members’ answers at the firm level (ICC[1] = 0.36; ICC[2] = 0.65). We assessed 
employee performance with a self-report scale based on the measure employed by Wieseke et 
al. (2009). We applied a subjective scale to compare the performance of employees from 
different firms (Homburg, Müller and Klarmann, 2011) and a self-report measure because 
many participating firms would not allow managers to share employees’ individual 
performance information. We adjusted the performance measure to capture employees’ 
performance relative to colleagues from the same firm (i.e. employee performance = 
individual performance - mean individual performance within the firm).2  
We included a number of potentially important factors as control variables both at the 
firm level and employee level: Organizational formalization, measured with the scale of 
Jansen, Van Den Bosch and Volberda (2006), because it limits employee autonomy and thus 
may influence the employee CO‐performance relationship; employee job resources, captured 
by the quality of internal cooperation, because in addition to CO as a crucial job resource for 
employees (Zablah et al., 2012), the quality of contact to and collaboration with internal 
partners is an important job resource which may affect both employee CO and performance 
(Plouffe et al., 2016); employee job demand, measured with an item based on Dwyer and 
Ganster (1991), because the demandingness of work-related activities may both directly affect 
employee CO and performance and influence the employee CO‐performance relationship 
(Zablah et al., 2012); employee job stress, measured as the number of sick days (e.g. Dwyer 
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  The correlation between the adjusted and the unadjusted measures of performance is very high (r = 0.93, p < 
0.001) and using an unadjusted performance measure led to similar results in the main analysis and the 
robustness tests. 
and Ganster, 1991), because stress may negatively affect both employee CO and performance 
(Zablah et al., 2012); employee job engagement, measured with an item based on Rich, 
Lepine and Crawford (2010), because this positive, work-related affective-motivational state 
of mind may increase both employee CO and performance (Zablah et al., 2012); and co-
worker customer orientation because the customer orientation of other employees may 
increase employee performance (Menguc et al., 2016). In addition, we control for number of 
employees, turnover in the previous year, and employee gender, age, education, and tenure. 
 
Measurement model and common method bias 
Two confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) on the top management and employee data 
indicated a good fit between the measurement model and the data (top management: χ2(2) = 
3.57; CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.06; employees: χ2(3) = 7.65; CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.04). We 
combined multiple sources and calculated deviation scores for the dependent variable (i.e. 
employee performance) to reduce single-source bias and common method bias. We also 
constructed the items and questionnaire as concisely as possible, minimized potential 
comprehension problems with pre-tests and included moderating effects in our statistical 
analyses, thereby reducing the potential for common method bias. 
 
Data analysis strategy 
Because of the multilevel nature of our data (employees are nested within companies, e.g. 
Kozlowski and Klein, 2000), we applied hierarchical linear modelling (HLM) with robust 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to test our hypotheses and used the log-likelihood 
difference test to compare the nested models (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). The sample sizes 
of both the higher-level sample (70 companies) and the lower-level sample (11.61 employees 
for each company) are in line with recommendations from simulation studies (Maas and Hox, 
2005), and higher than in other multilevel studies (e.g. Fong and Snape, 2015; van der Borgh, 
de Jong and Nijssen, 2015). Following the suggestion of Enders and Tofighi (2007), we 
applied group-mean centring for all exploratory variables involved in cross-level interactions 
(i.e. employee CO) and all other predictor variables at level 1 and level 2 were grand mean-
centred on their respective levels.3 
 
Results 
The results are shown in Table 3. In Model 1.1, firm CO is positively related to employee CO 
(γ = 0.14, p < 0.001). In Model 1.2, a positive relationship is found between employees’ CO 
and their performance (γ = 1.99, p < 0.007). In Model 1.3, the cross-level interaction between 
employee CO and firm CO is significant (γ = -3.78, p < 0.001), yielding support for H1. 
Simple slope analysis shows that the relationship between employee CO and performance is 
positive and significant at low levels of firm CO (γ = 3.68, p < 0.001), but not at high levels of 
firm CO (γ = -0.03, p = 0.96) (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. The interplay between employee and firm customer orientation in Study 1 
Employee Customer Orientation × Firm Customer Orientation on Employee Performance 
 
Notes: CO = customer orientation. The dotted line represents a non-significant effect in Figure 3.
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  We replicated our analyses with a grand-mean centring strategy: All the results remained stable. 
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Table 3. HLM results explaining employee customer orientation and employee performance 
 Study 1 Study 2 
 
Model 1.1 
Employee CO 
Model 1.2 
Employee 
Performance 
Model 1.3 
Employee 
Performance 
Model 2.1 
Employee CO 
Model 2.2 
Employee 
Performance 
Model 2.3 
Employee 
Performance 
Model 2.4 
Employee 
Performance 
Level and Variable γ SE γ SE γ SE γ SE γ SE γ SE γ SE 
 
              
Intercept 5.98** 0.04 -0.23 0.44 -0.22 0.44 6.38** 0.05 5.29** 0.07 5.29** 0.07 5.29** 0.07 
               
Level 2: Firm               
Firm Customer Orientation 0.14** 0.04 0.55 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.13* 0.06 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.11 
Firm Selling Orientation – – – – – – 0.14* 0.06 -0.17 0.11 -0.15 0.10 -0.13 0.10 
Organizational Formalization 0.03 0.05 -0.90 0.91 -0.90 0.92 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.06 
Number of Employees -0.05† 0.02 0.37 0.25 0.36 0.25 0.06† 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
Turnover in the Previous Year 0.02† 0.01 -0.03 0.17 -0.03 0.17 -0.07 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 
Level 1: Employee               
Employee Customer Orientation – – 1.99** 0.73 1.83** 0.56 – – 1.05** 0.31 0.84** 0.29 1.00** 0.29 
Employee Selling Orientation – – – – – – -0.22** 0.06 -0.09 0.10 -0.10 0.11 -0.16 0.10 
Employee Job Resources 0.09** 0.03 0.73 0.49 0.69 0.49 0.11 0.08 -0.04 0.11 -0.03 0.12 -0.07 0.12 
Employee Job Demands -0.14** 0.03 -3.07** 0.84 -3.06** 0.83 -0.09 0.38 -0.27 0.66 -0.60 0.64 -0.19 0.66 
Employee Job Stress -0.01 0.01 -0.51** 0.12 -0.51** 0.12 – – – – – – – – 
Employee Job Engagement 0.10** 0.02 0.67 0.45 0.63 0.46 – – – – – – – – 
Employee Emotional Labour – – – – – – 0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06 
Co-Worker Customer Orientation – – -2.14 1.49 -1.97 1.54 – – 0.48* 0.18 0.47* 0.18 0.47** 0.17 
Performance-Contingent Rewards – – – – – – 0.04 0.30 0.65 0.50 0.78 0.50 0.03 0.38 
Employee Gender -0.12† 0.06 -1.99 1.77 -1.81 1.77 0.01 0.18 -0.21 0.26 -0.15 0.27 -0.03 0.27 
Employee Age 0.01** 0.00 -0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Employee Education 0.05** 0.02 -1.37† 0.74 -1.41† 0.74 -0.09* 0.04 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.07 
Employee Tenure 0.01 0.00 -0.25† 0.13 -0.25† 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Two-Way Interactions               
Employee CO × Firm CO     -3.78** 1.13     -0.54* 0.23 -0.61** 0.18 
Employee CO × Performance-Contingent Rewards             0.40 0.50 
Firm CO × Performance-Contingent Rewards             -0.79* 0.34 
Three-Way Interaction               
Employee CO × Firm CO ×  
Performance-Contingent Rewards 
            1.57** 0.45 
               
-2 log-likelihood 1,973.74 7,415.23 7,411.95 239.46 430.43 419.15 406.58 
Change in fit    3.29†   11.29** 12.56** 
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.31 0.25 0.30 0.35 
 
Notes: NStudy1 = 813 employees and 70 firms, NStudy2 = 166 employees and 62 firms. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10. Significance is based on two-tailed tests; unstandardized results with robust 
standard errors. CO = customer orientation. We calculated within-level Pseudo R2 with the formula of Snijders and Bosker (1999). We applied group-mean centring for all exploratory variables 
involved in cross-level interactions, all other predictor variables at level 1 and level 2 were grand mean-centred on their respective levels. 
Robustness tests and supplementary analysis 
We replicated our analyses with a structural equation model to rule out the possibility of 
measurement error biasing our results. As a supplementary analysis, we further test for the 
conditional indirect effect of firm CO on employee performance. We used a parsimonious 
model and a robust MLE. The main effects model showed good fit (χ2 (75) = 229.59, CFI = 
0.96, RMSEA = 0.05). In line with suggestions from previous research (Boles et al., 2001; 
Cross et al., 2007), employee CO fully mediates the effect of firm CO on employee 
performance (γ = 0.52, p < 0.09, 95% CI = 0.02; 1.00)4. Adding the interaction between firm 
CO and employee CO significantly improves the model fit (-2LL change = 3.37, p < 0.07) 
and its effect on employee performance is significant (γ = -5.08, p < 0.07). The postulated 
moderation effect further qualifies the indirect effect of firm CO on employee performance: 
this indirect effect is positive and significant only if firm CO is low (γ = 0.80, p < 0.05, 95% 
CI = 0.04; 1.57), but not when firm CO is high (γ = 0.24, p = 0.31, 95% CI = -0.15; 0.63). 
 
Discussion 
Study 1 identifies a substitution effect whereby firm CO buffers the relationship between 
employees’ CO and their performance. Specifically, we find that employee CO is not related 
to employee performance when firm CO is high. Moreover, post-hoc analyses on the indirect 
effect indicate that firm CO does not indirectly contribute to employee performance through 
employee CO when firm CO is high. Given these findings, the question that arises is whether 
managers are able to resolve this substitution effect and attain the benefits of firm CO without 
generating undesired consequences for employees, namely the perception of a weak link 
between CO and individual performance. We explicitly address this question in Study 2. 
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  All confidence intervals (CIs) for mediation effects correspond to directional one-tailed hypothesis tests. 
Study 2 
Data collection and measures 
In our second study, we contacted 1,924 sales employees using a database provided by the 
Swiss Professional Marketing Association. These salespeople work for various B2B 
companies with different levels of firm CO and with various compensation schemes, ranging 
from 100% fixed compensation to 100% variable compensation. We chose a B2B context 
because employee CO is of the greatest importance for a B2B firm’s marketing strategy (e.g. 
Gummesson, 2004). After one follow-up, we received 382 fully completed questionnaires 
(20% response rate). We did not identify systematic differences in demographics and 
constructs means between early and late respondents. To reduce the risk of common method 
bias, we only retained responses from 62 firms for which more than one employee replied in 
our main analyses. In taking these steps, we followed the recommendation of Podsakoff et al. 
(2003) to differentiate the measurement sources of the variables. As a consequence, our main 
analyses are based on a sample of 166 employees from 62 firms. We also replicated our 
analyses with the combined sample of all respondents (n = 382) as a robustness test. 
We pre-tested all measurement scales with 24 sales managers at a professional development 
workshop. Appendix 2 provides an overview of all measurement items and reliability 
measures; Table 2 displays means, standard deviations and average variance extracted for the 
main sample.5 All scales had satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha values. We used Thomas, Soutar 
and Ryan’s (2001) scale to assess the CO of employees with direct customer contact. We 
measured firm CO with the scale used by Deshpandé, Farley and Webster (1993). The ICCs 
provided statistical support for aggregation at the firm level (ICC[1] = 0.62; ICC[2] = 0.81). 
We assessed employee performance with a scale suitable for sales employees, adapted from 
Homburg, Müller and Klarmann (2011). All employees provided information regarding their 
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  Further information about the validation sample is available upon request from the authors. 
performance-contingent rewards, operationalized as a continuous variable ranging from 100% 
for straight commission (salary has no role in the compensation plan) to 0% (salary has an 
exclusive role in the compensation plan) (John and Weitz, 1989). We controlled for the firm’s 
selling orientation (new measure; ICC[1] = 0.64; ICC[2] = 0.82), organizational formalization 
(based on Jansen et al., 2006), employee job resources (based on Plouffe et al., 2016), 
employee job demands (based on Marshall et al., 1999; Moncrief and Marshall, 2005), 
employee emotional labour (based on Hennig-Thurau et al., 2006), co-worker customer 
orientation (Menguc et al., 2016), number of employees, turnover in the previous year, and 
employees’ selling orientation (Thomas et al., 2001), gender, age, education and tenure. 
 
Measurement model and common method bias 
CFA indicated a good fit of the measurement model with the data (χ2(194) = 350.98; CFI = 
0.89; RMSEA = 0.07). We used the same methods as in Study 1 to reduce the potential for 
common method bias. In addition―and because we obtained several multi-item constructs 
from the same source in Study 2―we estimated a further CFA model that included a latent 
method factor with paths to each item (Podsakoff et al., 2003). All substantive factor loadings 
remained significant and the method factor accounted for only 5.32% of variance. 
 
Data analysis strategy 
Because employees are nested within different companies, the data structure suggests the use 
of multi-level modelling. While the higher-level sample size (62 companies) is well in line 
with common standards for multilevel models, the lower-level sample size is quite small (2.68 
employees for each company). However, simulation studies justify the use of multi-level 
modelling despite the small lower-level sample size. For example, Maas and Hox (2005, p. 
86) argued that ‘only a small sample size at level two (meaning a sample of 50 or less) leads 
to biased estimates’ and McNeish (2014, p. 558) concluded that ‘both methods [multi-level 
modelling and generalized estimating equations] are reasonable for accounting for the 
clustered data structure even with sparse data containing very few observations per cluster’. 
Thus, we applied HLM with robust MLE and log-likelihood difference tests, group-mean 
centring for all exploratory variables involved in cross-level interactions (i.e. employee CO 
and performance rewards), and grand-mean centring for all other predictors.6  
 
Results 
We obtained similar results with respect to H1 as in Study 1, even after controlling for the 
effects of firm and employee selling orientation. The interaction of employee CO with firm 
CO (γ = -0.54, p < 0.03) in Model 2.3 is significant and in line with our predictions. In Model 
2.4, we found a positive three-way interaction between employee CO, firm CO and 
performance-contingent rewards (γ = 1.57, p < 0.001), supporting H2. 
In Figure 4, we probe this three-way interaction by plotting the simple slope of employee 
CO at one standard deviation above and below the mean of firm CO and the mean of 
performance-contingent rewards. In the case of low performance-contingent rewards (Panel 
A), there is a positive effect of employee CO on employee performance when firm CO is low 
(γ = 1.90, p < 0.001) and a non-significant negative effect when firm CO is high (γ = -0.10, p 
= 0.83; p < 0.001 for the slope difference test). In contrast, we find no significant difference in 
the positive relationship between employee CO and their performance between high (γ = 0.91, 
p < 0.02) and low (γ = 1.30, p < 0.001) firm CO when performance-contingent rewards are 
high (Panel B; p = 0.35 for the slope difference test). In summary, consistent with our 
hypothesis, the substitution effect between firm CO and employee CO on performance is not 
detected under a high level of performance-contingent rewards. 
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  We replicated our analyses with simple regression, generalized estimating equations, and a grand-mean 
centring strategy: all results remained stable. 
Figure 4. The contingency role of performance-related rewards in Study 2 
Panel A: Low Performance-Contingent Rewards 
 
Panel B: High Performance-Contingent Rewards 
 
Notes: CO = customer orientation. The dotted line represents a non-significant effect in Figure 4 Panel A. 
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Robustness tests and supplementary analysis 
First, we re-estimated our model using the combined sample of all respondents, including the 
216 additional employees from 216 different firms. We used simple regression analysis and 
included the same controls as in the main analysis. The results confirm the findings from the 
main analyses (see Appendix 3). We find a negative interaction of employee CO with firm 
CO on employee performance (b = -0.12, p < 0.007) and a positive three-way interaction 
between employee CO, firm CO and performance-contingent rewards on employee 
performance (b = 1.48, p < 0.001). Second, we replicated our analyses with an adjusted 
measure of employee performance relative to colleagues from the same firm (i.e. employee 
performance = individual performance - mean individual performance within the firm) and 
found the same effects as in the main analysis (all hypotheses supported at p < 0.01). Third, 
we tested whether firm CO affects the performance-contingent rewards of employees and 
found no significant effect (b = -0.04, p = 0.12); thus, performance-contingent rewards appear 
to be an independent compensation device that firms use irrespective of their CO level. We 
further replicated our analyses using a parsimonious structural equation model. The main 
effects model showed good fit (χ2 (159) = 211.12, CFI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.05) and employee 
CO fully mediates the effect of firm CO on employee performance (γ = 0.10, p < 0.02, 95% 
CI = 0.02; 0.19). Adding the interactions significantly improved model fit (-2LL change = 
22.86, p < 0.001): The interaction between employee CO and firm CO is negatively related to  
employee performance (γ = -1.42, p < 0.01), and the three-way interaction between employee 
CO, firm CO, and performance-contingent rewards is positively related to employee 
performance (γ =3.03, p < 0.03). When performance-contingent rewards are low, the indirect 
effect of firm CO on employee performance is positive and significant only if firm CO is low 
(γ = 0.19, p < 0.02, 95% CI = 0.04; 0.34), but not when firm CO is high (γ = -0.05, p = 0.48, 
95% CI = -0.16; 0.07). A Wald Tests of parameter equality confirms this observation (Δχ2 = 
2.94, d.f. = 1, p < 0.05). In contrast, we find no significant difference in the indirect positive 
relationship between firm CO and employee performance between high firm CO (γ = 0.13, p 
< 0.07, 95% CI = -0.01; 0.26) and low firm CO (γ = 0.14, p < 0.02, 95% CI = 0.04; 0.24) 
when performance-contingent rewards are high (Wald Tests of parameter equality: Δχ2 = 
0.03, d.f. = 1, p = 0.86). 
 
Discussion 
Study 2 provides additional evidence that there is a substitution effect between firm CO and 
employee CO with respect to employee performance, and that the level of firm CO further 
affects the indirect effect on employee performance. More importantly, this study also 
identifies how managers can mitigate this substitutional effect by using performance-
contingent rewards. Notably, we replicated our findings from the main analysis with a 
validation sample. 
 
General discussion 
In this paper, we identify and explain a potential tension that needs to be managed between a 
firm’s emphasis on CO and employees’ perception of the value of such behaviour. This is the 
first study to include both cross-level direct effects from firm CO to employee CO and cross-
level interaction effects between firm CO and employee CO on employee performance. The 
simultaneous analysis of these two types of cross-level effects is important as it brings to the 
surface a substitution effect. Based on SDT, and using the distinction between autonomous 
and controlled motivation, we propose that the link between employee CO and employee 
performance will be stronger in firms with lower levels of CO. Furthermore, we examined a 
boundary condition for this hypothesis and posited that when performance-contingent rewards 
are introduced, the substitution effect described above is weakened. 
Both Study 1 and Study 2 indicate a positive cross-level effect of firm CO on employee 
CO and a negative cross-level moderating effect of firm CO on the positive relationship 
between employee CO and employee performance. In Study 2, we further found a positive 
three-way interaction between firm CO, employee CO and performance-contingent rewards 
on employee performance. We were able to replicate the full set of results with a validation 
sample. Taken together, our findings are robust across different types of employees (back 
office vs. customer-contact employees), measurements of key variables (top management 
team vs. organizational CO and measurement of performance) and data sources (key 
informants vs. multiple informants). 
 
Theoretical implications  
We contribute to the CO implementation literature in three important ways. First, scholars 
agree that employees have two main motivations for adopting CO: the need to comply with 
the normative mandate of the firm’s CO (Gebhardt, Carpenter and Sherry, 2006) and the 
expectation of superior individual job performance (Zablah et al., 2012). While the former 
can relate to both autonomous and controlled motivation, the latter is an inherently 
autonomous motivation because employees rely on their own judgment in terms of whether or 
not to adopt a CO (Gagné and Deci, 2005). Our work reveals an interesting interplay between 
the emphasis a firm places on CO and the extent to which CO is an individual success factor. 
Consequently, we propose an extended view of the process through which managers influence 
the adoption of a CO by employees. In doing so, we integrate the autonomous and controlled 
motivations in the CO context. This is also important to qualify the indirect relationship 
between firm CO and employee performance via employee CO suggested by previous 
research (Boles et al., 2001; Cross et al., 2007). We formally test this indirect relationship for 
the first time and find that the indirect effect of firm CO on employee performance appears to 
be conditional on the level of firm CO. In summary, our model and findings suggest that 
neglecting to consider the two different motivations simultaneously may explain the frequent 
failures of CO initiatives within firms.  
Second, with regard to the moderating role of firm CO in the relationship between 
employee CO and employee performance, our study contributes to the ongoing debate 
concerning the extent to which employees benefit from their CO. Indeed, both Franke and 
Park (2006) and Zablah et al. (2012) observed significant variance in the meta-analytic 
correlations between employee CO and performance, and the moderator analyses in their 
work provided mixed results. Our findings suggest that the CO in the broader organizational 
context determines the performance effects of an employee’s CO. This potential moderator 
was not examined by previous studies and thus represents a novel finding and explanation of 
the heterogeneity of the employee CO–performance relationship, given that our study takes 
into account additional control variables and moderators reported by previous research. In 
firms with low CO, employees rely on their personal interests and enjoyment to direct their 
customer-oriented behaviour and thus high employee CO will be less frequent but more 
authentic compared to firms with high CO. Thus, employees with high CO are more likely to 
outperform other employees within their firm. In contrast, in firms with high CO, the 
performance effects of employees’ CO will be diluted because CO initiatives instil at least 
some controlled motivation for employees, making employee CO―other things being 
equal―more frequent but less likely to be internalized. 
Third, our results point to a different and novel interpretation of the role and importance 
of performance-contingent rewards for CO. Indeed, such rewards help balance the negative 
effect of the normative pressure to comply with the organizational mandate, rather than 
working as a direct motivator to take on CO behaviours. This effect is due to a stronger 
perception of autonomy and competence as being related to CO, which in turn drives the 
adoption of the behaviour in question by individual employees. Hence, an important 
theoretical implication of our results is that performance-contingent rewards enable a fairer 
redistribution of the value employees help create. Indeed, marketing scholars propose value 
creation through relational and collaborative exchanges between the firm, its representatives 
and its customers (Vargo and Lusch, 2008), while calling for a balanced consideration of the 
roles and rewards among this network of actors (Gummesson, 2008). We further find that 
when performance-contingent rewards are low, the indirect effect of firm CO on employee 
performance is positive and significant only if firm CO is low, but not when it is high, leading 
to an undesired situation for firms. In contrast, we find no significant difference in the indirect 
positive relationship between firm CO and employee performance for high and low firm CO 
when performance-contingent rewards are high, further supporting the importance of 
performance-contingent rewards in aligning the benefits of individual and firm CO. 
 
Managerial implications 
Our findings have direct implications for the implementation of customer-oriented initiatives 
within firms. Specifically, we shed light on how organizational leaders can influence the CO 
process by acting jointly on the top-down diffusion of CO and complementary aspects related 
to the work environment and performance-related pay. A first suggestion would be to include 
specific references to the benefits of CO for individual performance in various strategic 
initiatives (i.e. training, work procedures, internal communications) to emphasize the 
importance of individuals adopting CO. In companies that strongly encourage their employees 
to be customer-oriented, this may counterbalance the tendency towards low internalization of 
the behaviour. A second recommendation is to monitor and measure the perceived 
effectiveness of CO as part of the strategy implementation process, to detect the potential 
tension highlighted by our study. For example, using performance appraisals or staff surveys, 
line managers can gauge the extent to which their employees perceive CO as a key 
performance factor. Finally, we advise managers to implement appropriate performance-
contingent rewards in conjunction with organizational initiatives that will promote or re-
launch the adoption of customer-oriented behaviours among employees, with specific 
reference to the sales force. Also, our findings suggest that rather than ‘pushing’ employees to 
become more customer-oriented, performance-contingent rewards should ‘pull’ employees in 
that direction by helping them to associate CO with individual performance. Thus, a further 
recommendation pertains to the communication of performance-related rewards. For example, 
rewards could be directly associated with relevant customer metrics, which in turn may be 
portrayed as naturally linked to the adoption of customer-oriented behaviour by individual 
employees. The ultimate aim here is to manage the organizational culture, environment and 
rewards to maximize the internalization of CO by individual employees. 
 
Limitations  
The empirical results across the two studies should be interpreted bearing their limitations in 
mind. First, we were not able to explicitly measure the proposed mechanism which transmits 
the moderating effect of firm CO on the relationship between employee CO and employee 
performance (controlled and autonomous motivation). Although the proposed mechanism is 
in line with SDT and the CO literature, future research should validate the proposed process 
by measuring the different types of motivation. Second, the cross-sectional nature of the data 
does not allow us to infer causality. Further research using longitudinal data or an 
experimental design could address this issue. Third, because no objective measures of 
performance were available, we relied on employees’ self-reported performance. Although 
empirical evidence shows that subjective measures may often ‘do a better job of tapping the 
content domain of the performance construct’ (Rich et al., 1999, p. 52) than objective 
measures, future studies may seek to replicate our results with objective measures of 
performance. Fourth, the comparability of the studies is somewhat limited: the back office 
employees in Study 1 received no substantial performance-linked incentives, Study 2 used 
different measures from those in Study 1 and we were only able to test for the moderating role 
of performance-contingent rewards with a sample of customer-contact employees. Examining 
whether this relationship holds for back office employees could be worthwhile because these 
employees may be subject to different compensation arrangements. Fifth, while we controlled 
for organizational formalization, we were not able to include ‘service scripts’ among our 
controls because none of the participating firms use service scripts for their back-office 
employees and sales employees. Thus, future research should validate our model with 
frontline service employees and explicitly consider the role of service scripts. Finally, the 
substitution effects of firm CO may further depend on how organizations communicate CO to 
their employees and other factors, such as the ability of customers to detect surface acting, 
may affect the relationships proposed and tested in our model.7 Thus, investigating whether 
firms may use certain communication tactics to anticipate the substitution effect and 
considering how customer characteristics may affect the interplay between employee and firm 
CO are promising research directions.  
 
Future research directions 
In addition to the limitations mentioned above, our study points to interesting directions for 
future research. While we focus on CO as a prominent strategic orientation, future 
investigations can explore the cross-level effects that we examined by taking into account 
different dimensions of organizational culture and strategic orientation which span firms and 
individuals in terms of behaviours and performance implications (e.g. entrepreneurship or 
learning orientation). Second, our research context was homogeneous in terms of cultural 
traits (Hofstede, 1985). Given Hohenberg and Homburg’s (2016) findings that various 
financial and nonfinancial steering instruments are differentially effective in motivating 
employees across cultures, future studies could replicate our analyses in countries with 
varying levels of individualism, power distance, or uncertainty avoidance to produce 
interesting cross-cultural comparisons. Finally, while we reveal the importance of 
                                                          
7
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing these limitations and future research directions out to us. 
performance-contingent rewards, future research could examine the ability of additional 
elements of the work environment and job characteristics to promote autonomous motivation. 
  
References 
Allen, J. A., S. D. Pugh, A. A. Grandey and M. Groth (2010). ‘Following display rules in good 
or bad faith? Customer orientation as a moderator of the display rule-emotional labor 
relationship’, Human Performance, 23, pp. 101–115. 
Amabile, T. M. (1993). ‘Motivational synergy: toward new conceptualizations of intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation in the workplace’, Human Resource Management Review, 3, pp. 185-
201. 
Amabile, T. M., K. G. Hill, B. A. Hennessey and E. M. Tighe (1994). ‘The work preference 
inventory: assessing intrinsic and extrinsic motivational orientations’, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 66, pp. 950–967. 
Bliese, P. D. (2000), ‘Within-group agreement, non-independence, and reliability: implications 
for data aggregation and analysis’. In K. J. Klein and S. Kozlowski (eds), Multilevel 
Theory, Research, and Methods in Organizations: Foundations, Extensions, and New 
Directions, pp. 349–381. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Boles, J. S., B. J. Babin, T. G. Brashear and C. Brooks (2001). ‘An examination of the 
relationships between retail work environments, salesperson selling orientation-customer 
orientation and job performance’, Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 9, pp. 1-13. 
Brach, S., G. Walsh, T. Hennig‐Thurau and M. Groth (2015). ‘A dyadic model of customer 
orientation: mediation and moderation effects’, British Journal of Management, 26, pp. 
292–309. 
Cerasoli, C. P., J. M. Nicklin and M. T. Ford (2014). ‘Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic 
incentives jointly predict performance: a 40-year meta-analysis’, Psychological Bulletin, 
140, pp. 980–1008. 
CMO Council (2008). ‘Technology marketers challenged to reorganize around customers’. 
Available at http:// http://www.cmocouncil.org/press-detail.php?id=103 [accessed 2 
August 2015]. 
Cross, M. E., T. G. Brashear, E. E. Rigdon and D. N. Bellenger (2007). ‘Customer orientation 
and salesperson performance’, European Journal of Marketing, 41, pp. 821-835. 
Deci, E. L., R. Koestner and R. M. Ryan, (1999). ‘A meta-analytic review of experiments 
examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation’, Psychological Bulletin, 
125, pp. 627–668. 
Deshpandé, R., J. U. Farley and F. E. Webster Jr (1993). ‘Corporate culture, customer 
orientation, and innovativeness in Japanese firms: a quadrad analysis’, Journal of 
Marketing, 57, pp. 23–37. 
Donavan, T. D., T. J. Brown and J. C. Mowen (2004). ‘Internal benefits of service-worker 
customer orientation: job satisfaction, commitment, and organizational citizenship 
behaviours’, Journal of Marketing, 68, pp. 128–146. 
Dwyer, D. J., and D. C. Ganster (1991). ‘The effects of job demands and control on employee 
attendance and satisfaction’, Journal of Organizational Behavior, 12, pp. 595–608. 
Enders, C. K. and D. Tofighi (2007), ‘Centering predictor variables in cross-sectional 
multilevel models: a new look at an old issue’, Psychological Methods, 12, pp. 121–138. 
Fong, C. T. and L. Z. Tiedens (2002). ‘Dueling experiences and dual ambivalences: emotional 
and motivational ambivalence of women in high status positions’, Motivation and 
Emotion, 26, pp. 105–121. 
Fong, K. H. and E. Snape (2015). ‘Empowering leadership, psychological empowerment and 
employee outcomes: testing a multi‐level mediating model’, British Journal of 
Management, 26, pp. 126–138. 
Franke, G. R. and J. E.Park (2006). ‘Salesperson adaptive selling behaviour and customer 
orientation: a meta-analysis’, Journal of Marketing Research, 43, pp. 693–702. 
Gagné, M. and E. L. Deci (2005). ‘Self-determination theory and work motivation’, Journal of 
Organizational Behavior, 26, pp. 331–362. 
Gebhardt, G. F., G. S. Carpenter and J. F. Sherry Jr (2006). ‘Creating a market orientation: a 
longitudinal, multifirm, grounded analysis of cultural transformation’, Journal of 
Marketing, 70, pp. 37–55. 
Gerhart, B. and M. Fang (2015). ‘Pay, intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, performance, 
and creativity in the workplace: revisiting long-held beliefs’, Annual Review of 
Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 2, pp. 489–521. 
Grant, A. M. (2008). ‘Does intrinsic motivation fuel the prosocial fire? Motivational synergy in 
predicting persistence, performance, and productivity’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 93, 
pp. 48–58. 
Grant, A. M., S. Nurmohamed, S. J. Ashford and K. Dekas (2011). ‘The performance 
implications of ambivalent initiative: the interplay of autonomous and controlled 
motivations’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 116, pp. 241–251. 
Guenzi, P., L. M. De Luca and G. Troilo (2011). ‘Organizational drivers of salespeople’s 
customer orientation and selling orientation’, Journal of Personal Selling & Sales 
Management, 31, pp. 269–285. 
Gummesson, E. (2004). ‘Return on relationships (ROR): the value of relationship marketing 
and CRM in business-to-business contexts’, Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 
19, pp. 136–148. 
Gummesson, E. (2008). ‘Extending the service-dominant logic: from customer centricity to 
balanced centricity’, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 36, pp. 15–17. 
Harris, L. C. and E. Ogbonna (2000). ‘The responses of front-line employees to market-
oriented culture change’, European Journal of Marketing, 34, pp. 318–340. 
Hennig-Thurau, T., M. Groth, M. Paul and D. D. Gremler (2006). ‘Are all smiles created 
equal? How employee–customer emotional contagion and emotional labor affect service 
relationships’, Journal of Marketing, 70, pp. 58–73. 
Hofstede, G. (1985). ‘The interaction between national and organizational value systems’, 
Journal of Management Studies, 22, pp. 347–357. 
Hohenberg, S. and C. Homburg (2016). ‘Motivating sales reps for innovation selling in 
different cultures’, Journal of Marketing, 80, pp. 101–120. 
Homburg, C., M. Müller and M. Klarmann (2011). ‘When should the customer really be king? 
On the optimum level of salesperson customer orientation in sales encounters’, Journal of 
Marketing, 75, pp. 55–74. 
Jansen, J. J., F. A. Van Den Bosch and H. W. Volberda (2006). ‘Exploratory innovation, 
exploitative innovation, and performance: Effects of organizational antecedents and 
environmental moderators’, Management Science, 52, pp. 1661–1674. 
John, G. and B.Weitz (1989). ‘Salesforce compensation: an empirical investigation of factors 
related to use of salary versus incentive compensation’, Journal of Marketing Research, 
26, pp. 1–14. 
Kennedy, K. N., F. G. Lassk and J. R. Goolsby (2002). ‘Customer mind-set of employees 
throughout the organization’, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 30, pp. 159–
171. 
Kozlowski, S. and K. J. Klein (2000). ‘A multilevel approach to theory and research in 
organizations: Contextual, temporal, and emergent processes’. In K. J. Klein and S. 
Kozlowski (eds), Multilevel Theory, Research, and Methods in Organizations: 
Foundations, Extensions, and New Directions, pp. 3–90. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Liao, H. and A. Chuang (2004). ‘A multilevel investigation of factors influencing employee 
service performance and customer outcomes’, Academy of Management Journal, 47, pp. 
41–58. 
Liao, H. and M. Subramony (2008). ‘Employee customer orientation in manufacturing 
organizations: joint influences of customer proximity and the senior leadership team’, 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 93, pp. 317–328. 
Lichtenthal, J. D. and D. T. Wilson (1992). ‘Becoming market oriented’, Journal of Business 
Research, 24, pp. 191–207. 
Lin, C. H. V., K. Sanders, J. M. J. Sun, H. Shipton and E. A. Mooi (2016). ‘From customer‐
oriented strategy to organizational financial performance: the role of human resource 
management and customer‐linking capability’, British Journal of Management, 27, pp. 21–
37. 
Maas, C. J. and J. J. Hox (2005). ‘Sufficient sample sizes for multilevel modeling’, 
Methodology, 1, pp. 86–92. 
MacKenzie, S. B., P. M. Podsakoff and G. A. Rich (2001). ‘Transformational and transactional 
leadership and salesperson performance’, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 
29, pp. 115–134. 
Marshall, G. W., W. C. Moncrief, and F. G. Lassk (1999). ‘The current state of sales force 
activities’, Industrial Marketing Management, 28, pp. 87–98. 
McNeish, D. M. (2014). ‘Modeling sparsely clustered data: design-based, model-based, and 
single-level methods’, Psychological methods, 19, pp. 552–563. 
Menguc, B., S. Auh, C. S. Katsikeas and Y. S. Jung (2016). ‘When does (mis) fit in customer 
orientation matter for frontline employees’ job satisfaction and performance?’, Journal of 
Marketing, 80, pp. 65–83. 
Moncrief, W. C. and G. W. Marshall (2005). ‘The evolution of the seven steps of selling’, 
Industrial Marketing Management, 34, pp. 13–22. 
Narver, J. C. and S. F. Slater (1990). ‘The effect of a market orientation on business 
profitability’, Journal of Marketing, 54, pp. 20–35. 
Plouffe, C. R., W. Bolander, J. A. Cote, and B. Hochstein (2016). ‘Does the customer matter 
most? Exploring strategic frontline employees’ influence of customers, the internal 
business team, and external business partners’, Journal of Marketing, 80, pp. 106–123. 
Podsakoff, P. M., S. B. MacKenzie, J.-Y. Lee and N. P. Podsakoff (2003). ‘Common method 
biases in behavioural research: a critical review of the literature and recommended 
remedies’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, pp. 879–903. 
Procter, S., L. McArdle, J. Hassard and M. Rowlinson (1993). ‘Performance related pay in 
practice: a critical perspective’, British Journal of Management, 4, pp. 153–160. 
Raudenbush, S. W. and A. S. Bryk (2002). Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data 
Analysis Methods. London: Sage Publications. 
Rich, G. A., W. H. Bommer, S. B. MacKenzie, P. Podsakoff and J. L. Johnson (1999). ‘Apples 
and apples or apples and oranges? A meta-analysis of objective and subjective measures of 
salesperson performance’, Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management, 29, pp. 41–
52. 
Rich, B. L., J. A. Lepine, and E. R. Crawford (2010). ‘Job engagement: Antecedents and 
effects on job performance’, Academy of Management Journal, 53, pp. 617–635. 
Ryan, R. M. and E. L. Deci (2000). ‘Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic 
motivation, social development, and well-being’, American Psychologist, 55, pp. 68–78. 
Ryan, R. M., V. Mims and R. Koestner (1983). ‘Relation of reward contingency and 
interpersonal context to intrinsic motivation: a review and test using cognitive evaluation 
theory,’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, pp. 736–750. 
Schmitz, C. and S. Ganesan (2014). ‘Managing customer and organizational complexity in 
sales organizations’, Journal of Marketing, 78, pp. 59–77. 
Stock, R. M. and W. D. Hoyer (2005). ‘An attitude–behaviour model of salespeople’s customer 
orientation’, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 33, pp. 536–552. 
Thomas, R. W., G. N. Soutar and M. M. Ryan (2001). ‘The selling orientation–customer 
orientation (S.O.C.O.) scale: a proposed short form’, Journal of Personal Selling & Sales 
Management, 21, pp. 63–70. 
van der Borgh, M., A. de Jong and .E J. Nijssen (2015). ‘Alternative mechanisms guiding 
salespersons’ ambidextrous product selling’, British Journal of Management, early view. 
Vargo, S. L. and R. F. Lusch (2008). ‘Service-dominant logic: continuing the evolution’, 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 36, pp. 1–10. 
Wieseke, J., M. Ahearne, S. K. Lam and R. van Dick (2009). ‘The role of leaders in internal 
marketing: a multilevel examination through the lens of social identity theory’, Journal of 
Marketing, 73, pp. 123–145. 
Williams, M. R. and J. S. Attaway (1996). ‘Exploring salespersons’ customer orientation as a 
mediator of organizational culture's influence on buyer-seller relationships’, Journal of 
Personal Selling & Sales Management, 16, pp. 33–52. 
Yoo, J. J. and T. J. Arnold (2016). ‘Frontline employee customer-oriented attitude in the 
presence of job demands and resources the influence upon deep and surface acting’, 
Journal of Service Research, 19, pp. 102–117. 
Zablah, A. R., G. R. Franke, T. J. Brown and D. E. Bartholomew (2012). ‘How and when does 
customer orientation influence frontline employee job outcomes? A meta-analytic 
evaluation’, Journal of Marketing, 76, pp. 21–40. 
